The Warrant for Removal and Disposal Before Trial

The warrant was granted. What common-law power authorised it?

On 20 March 1997 Sheriff Michael Fletcher granted a warrant to remove every animal in the cattle herd at Powhillon Farm. Procurator Fiscal David John Finlay Howdle had asked for authority to enter the holding, remove the entire herd, and permit Scottish Office veterinary officers thereafter to sell, slaughter or destroy the animals as they considered appropriate. Fletcher granted the application “as craved”. It was before trial, before conviction and without a determination of who owned the cattle.

The application arose from serious animal-welfare allegations, which had not been proved at a criminal trial when the whole-herd warrant was granted. The question is not whether officials could investigate suffering or intervene lawfully to protect an animal. It is what authority permitted this particular order, including the prospective permanent disposal of every animal before guilt had been determined.

Removal began the next morning. Government officers subsequently accounted for 193 cattle. By May animals had died or been destroyed, others had been sold, and those remaining were in official custody. The farm lost its working herd before any criminal trial at which the welfare allegations could be tested by evidence. The loss was practical, economic and evidential: animals dispersed or destroyed could not be examined in their original circumstances or returned to Powhillon after an acquittal.

This account follows the people, decisions and consequences of the removal. The separate As Craved examines the substantive legal authority for Howdle’s petition and Fletcher’s warrant, including the Scots-law warrant authorities and the statutory powers in force in March 1997.

The farm and the warnings before March 1997

Howdle already knew of the wider dispute at Powhillon. In 1993 he brought the prosecution concerning the shooting of three protected geese and breach of the peace. The defence put goose damage, the failure of scaring, licence applications and agricultural conditions before the court. Scottish Office agricultural officers gave defence evidence, and Daniel Quinn was acquitted of every charge. That history does not decide the later cattle allegations, but it establishes that the same Procurator Fiscal had previously encountered the agricultural circumstances of the holding.

On 28 April 1994 government veterinary officers Robert G. H. Smith and N. Winter inspected the cattle. In his letter of 4 May 1994, Smith criticised the numbers which could be managed during winter “with the available buildings”, the muddy route between silage and dry pasture, insufficient supplementary feeding for some younger cattle and uncastrated stock. Daniel accepted that the muddy route was undesirable. Smith specified corrective action, wrote to Daniel’s veterinary surgeon and proposed further inspection.

The qualification about “the available buildings” was significant. The holding’s buildings, drainage, water supply, fences and other fixed equipment were already the subject of R Hill & Co’s Damages Arbitration against the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust (WWT). The tenant alleged that the landlord had failed to maintain the agricultural infrastructure. Those allegations did not relieve the keeper of his welfare duties; they were part of the circumstances in which those duties had to be performed.

Scottish Office Veterinary Officer K. L. Kerr’s letter of 4 March 1997 recorded grave concerns following visits on 27 and 28 February. She described inadequate nutrition, competition for feed, breeding and record-keeping problems, dangerous material, unsuitable feeders, insufficient dry lying areas and carcasses requiring removal. Her letter also recorded Daniel’s responses: he said that some cattle had access to drier fields, acknowledged deficiencies in the records, and asked that a heifer unable to rise be euthanised. Kerr supplied guidance and proposed returning on 11 March to discuss action, with Daniel’s own veterinary surgeon present if he wished.

Howdle’s petition subsequently alleged further incidents on 11, 12 and 14 March involving a down cow and an emaciated calf. The allegations were serious; neither Kerr’s letter nor the petition constituted findings after cross-examination. Kerr had proposed remedial discussion on 4 March. By 18 March the Procurator Fiscal was instead seeking removal of every animal and the power to dispose of them permanently. The transition from inspection and proposed remedial action to that comprehensive remedy requires examination.

The distinction between observations, allegations and proved facts is especially important here. Smith’s 1994 letter records specific shortcomings but also proposed corrections. Kerr’s 4 March 1997 letter records potentially grave suffering and deficient management, yet also details Daniel’s replies and a proposed follow-up discussion. These documents establish genuine concerns requiring a response. They do not determine the condition of each animal in the herd on 20 March, establish the cause of every problem, or resolve the landlord’s responsibility for the infrastructure. The wider evidential and legal questions were still open when Howdle chose to seek a comprehensive removal order.

18 March 1997 — Howdle asks for the entire herd

Howdle’s original petition was headed in terms of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995; it did not identify section 134 or a provision of the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912. Section 134 was subsequently identified by Deputy Crown Agent Bill Gilchrist as the incidental procedure for bringing the application. The petition described Daniel as a partner in Hill & Company, which farmed Powhillon, and attributed practical responsibility for approximately 164 cattle to him.

The application sought more than examination, treatment or temporary safe custody. It asked for police officers, Scottish Office veterinary officers and SSPCA representatives to enter Powhillon, take all the cattle to other farms in Dumfries and Galloway or the Lothian Animal Welfare Centre at Balerno, and give the veterinary officers discretion thereafter to manage the animals, including by humane destruction, slaughter or sale. Transport, feeding, veterinary, sale, slaughter and upkeep costs were to be deducted before any remaining proceeds were paid to Daniel.

Permanent disposal was not an unforeseen development after the removal. It was included in the order Howdle requested from the outset. His petition did not determine whether the cattle belonged to Daniel personally, R Hill & Co or another owner. Nor did it identify separate conditions requiring a further judicial decision before sale or slaughter. These were questions about the particular remedy being sought, not a denial that welfare officers had legitimate responsibilities towards suffering animals.

The petition’s written grounds began with general allegations of inadequate food, shelter and veterinary attention, then referred to particular animal incidents and the officials’ concern for the herd as a whole. Its crave, however, did not distinguish a severely affected animal from one requiring routine care. It sought the same compulsory removal power over all of them and left any later destruction or sale to veterinary discretion. The question of why that precise order was competent is different from whether the prosecutor was entitled to bring animal-welfare allegations to the sheriff.

The proposed destination and costs provisions also mattered. They contemplated moving the cattle away from Powhillon and paying expenses out of the value realised on disposal. That is not equivalent to leaving animals on the holding for inspection or taking limited steps for their immediate protection. The nature of the relief sought should be read from Howdle’s actual words, rather than inferred from the label “incidental petition”.

18–20 March — notice, opposition and “as craved”

Fletcher did not sign the pre-typed grant of warrant when Howdle first presented the petition. On 18 March he heard the prosecutor, directed that a copy of the petition be intimated to Daniel and fixed a hearing for 9:30 a.m. on 20 March. The full application, including the proposed powers of permanent disposal, remained before the court.

Daniel’s account is that a police sergeant attended Powhillon at about 5:30 p.m. on Wednesday 19 March, informed him that the sheriff required him in court the next morning, but supplied no copy of the petition. Daniel said the Depute Procurator Fiscal read its terms aloud at the hearing. No surviving execution of service has been identified establishing that the ordered copy was delivered. The account is distinguished here from what the written interlocutor itself proves.

Daniel opposed the removal. In a subsequent letter dated 18 November 2002, Howdle confirmed: “He did oppose it but was unsuccessful.” There is consequently no basis in the documents examined for treating the herd as voluntarily relinquished by Daniel or R Hill & Co. His recollection also raises the question of whether consent or relinquishment was discussed at the hearing; the surviving interlocutor does not record the terms of any such exchange.

On 20 March Fletcher heard the Depute Procurator Fiscal and Daniel in reply. The handwritten decision was: “grants warrant as craved.” It records neither reasons for removing every animal nor a finding about ownership, and it identifies no substantive statutory or common-law power extending to prospective sale, slaughter or destruction before trial. The absence of written reasons does not prove what was or was not said orally; it does mean that the surviving judicial record does not explain the legal foundation or breadth of the order actually granted.

The sequence in the court papers is unusually short. Howdle presented the petition on Tuesday 18 March; Fletcher instructed intimation and fixed Thursday 20 March for Daniel’s appearance; Daniel says he was orally notified only late on Wednesday 19 March. The order ultimately granted on Thursday contained the whole of the original crave. The significance of an opportunity to be heard depends, in practice, upon knowing the application one must answer. Whether a sufficient copy was served is therefore a factual issue about compliance with Fletcher’s own direction, not merely a complaint about inconvenient notice.

21–22 March — the herd is removed

Removal began on Friday 21 March, the morning after the grant. The family account records Scottish Office veterinary personnel, police, quad bikes and twelve livestock lorries at Powhillon. Dr M. H. Lamont later reported that the Ministry removed 191 cattle on 21 and 22 March, and that two calves subsequently found at Powhillon brought the official total to 193. The difference between Howdle’s approximate 164 and Lamont’s eventual count is part of the record; neither number should be silently substituted for the other.

A whole-herd operation on this scale required transport, personnel, receiving premises and arrangements for keeping the animals. The petition itself named possible destinations. Preparations had evidently been made before Fletcher’s final decision. The available documents do not establish that the sheriff’s decision was predetermined; they do establish that the machinery for removing the herd was ready to operate immediately after his grant.

Daniel says he entered court without a copy of the petition and without a practical opportunity to arrange a challenge before removal began. No order suspending the warrant was obtained while the herd remained intact. Whatever routes of legal challenge were available, the immediate execution of the warrant made the consequences increasingly difficult to reverse.

The official total matters because the petition’s figure was approximate, whereas the removal became a concrete administrative undertaking affecting individual animals. Once cattle were transported to different premises, each decision about treatment, feeding, sale, slaughter or destruction concerned an identifiable living animal. The warrant authorised officials to take responsibility for those decisions; the complete records of how that responsibility was discharged have not been established in the material examined.

The operation also altered the practical position before the criminal trial could take place. The alleged keeper lost direct access to the animals whose condition formed the basis of the prosecution. As time passed and disposal proceeded, any assessment by independent veterinary witnesses of the herd as it had been at Powhillon became less possible. This consequence existed regardless of whether particular allegations of inadequate care were well founded.

The legal question raised by the warrant

Scots law already recognised distinct ways of dealing with livestock welfare: inspection, emergency action concerning an animal in serious distress, temporary custody in prescribed circumstances, and deprivation or destruction orders following conviction. The Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912, section 10 concerned urgent action towards a particular animal; section 11 provided a route for safe custody where its statutory conditions, including apprehension by a constable, were met; and sections 2 and 3 addressed orders in the criminal proceedings after conviction. Those distinct provisions did not, in the combination examined, confer an unrestricted whole-herd disposal power before conviction.

Government veterinarians already had statutory inspection powers, including under section 6 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968. The section 134 procedure subsequently relied upon for the petition provided a way to apply for a warrant or order where the court already possessed the necessary power. It did not, merely by providing procedure, establish that a sheriff could order the permanent disposal of all the farm’s cattle.

The available record does not establish the apprehension required for the particular safe-custody route in section 11. Daniel maintained that he had not been apprehended. In her letter of 7 January 2004, Chief Inspector Kate Thomson confirmed that he had not been charged with these offences by officers of Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary; her letter did not address apprehension. The formal criminal complaint was served on 22 March, after removal had begun. In any event, a power of temporary custody is not itself a power of permanent disposal.

The question remains what rule of Scots law, in force on 20 March 1997, permitted a sheriff to authorise removal of the entire herd and its possible permanent disposal before conviction. As Craved examines the statutes, historical warrant authorities and subsequent judicial decisions.

22 April — disposal before the allegations were tried

On 22 April 1997 Procurator Fiscal Depute R. T. Morrison wrote to Daniel. An intermediate diet was fixed for 4 June and trial dates for 19 and 20 June. The Crown was still considering amendments to dates in two charges. Nevertheless, Morrison reported that cattle with the necessary documentation were already being sold.

For cattle without records, Morrison stated that sale was not permitted and that destruction under the BSE regulations was the only available course. He asked whether Daniel objected and sought Cattle Control Documents. He described the veterinarians as empowered to sell under Fletcher’s warrant, with costs deducted before any balance was returned to Daniel. That is evidence of the Crown’s understanding and use of the warrant, not an independent identification of the substantive power on which Fletcher had relied.

The material consequence was already unfolding. Animals were being sold or considered for destruction while the criminal allegations remained unproved. The defence could no longer have the entire herd examined in its original environment, and an acquittal could not itself return dispersed or destroyed animals to the farm. The loss of this opportunity is distinct from deciding whether any particular welfare allegation was true.

The April correspondence makes the timing verifiable independently of the family’s recollection. The Crown had set criminal diets but was already administering sales under the March warrant. Morrison’s request for Daniel to assist with documentation was being made after control of the cattle had passed to officials, while costs continued to accumulate. The proposed deduction of those costs also meant that decisions during official custody would directly affect what value, if any, remained for the person to whom the Crown proposed to remit the proceeds.

Morrison referred to the BSE regulations as limiting the disposal of cattle lacking the required records. That statement should not be confused with a claim that disease-control legislation was the substantive authority under which Howdle originally sought to take the whole herd. The March petition had alleged inadequate welfare, and Fletcher’s order had granted the relief sought in that petition. A later practical difficulty with the sale or slaughter of individual animals did not explain the original competence of the whole-herd warrant.

15 May — the official account of 193 cattle

After Daniel asked for information, Dr M. H. Lamont provided the Ministry’s first full numerical account on 15 May 1997. He reported 191 animals removed on 21–22 March and two calves found afterwards. Of the 193 animals, three cows and eleven young cattle had died or been “humanely destroyed”, 77 had been sold and 102 remained in official care. Proceeds had been passed to the SSPCA and were being used towards treatment and management costs.

Lamont’s letter did not identify the fourteen animals individually or distinguish, animal by animal, those which died from those deliberately destroyed. It did not set out the condition or decision-making basis for each outcome. Those are substantive gaps when assessing the administration of an order that authorised irreversible disposal.

The documentation problem had been known before removal: Kerr had already raised deficiencies in identification and movement records. On 19 May Lamont asked for further birth and parentage information needed to obtain cattle passports and Cattle Control Documents. He reported that only two of 48 remaining younger animals were registered, two had numbers but were unregistered, and 44 were untagged. A Cattle Control Document issued on 28 May named “Mr R Hill & Co” at Powhillon. The surviving evidence does not establish that any healthy animal was destroyed solely because of missing documents; it shows that a known record-keeping difficulty continued to affect officials after they had taken possession of the herd.

By mid-May the arithmetic of custody was clear, but it was not an animal-by-animal final account. Lamont’s fourteen deaths or destructions were grouped together; the records inspected for this narrative did not attribute a particular outcome, medical justification and disposal decision to each named animal. Such detail matters because the warrant left officials with discretion over outcomes that could not be undone. It matters also when comparing the originally alleged condition of the cattle with their condition after transport and custody at several premises.

The original welfare criticisms about identification records did not disappear once the animals were removed. The Ministry’s later requests show that the same deficiencies affected what officials could lawfully sell and how the stock could be traced. No causal explanation for the fourteen reported losses can be inferred merely from that coincidence. It does, however, place the known documentary problem in its proper chronology: it was identified before the warrant and remained relevant while the authorities were disposing of the animals.

Ownership remained unresolved

The cattle’s ownership was not an afterthought. In an October 1993 notice, solicitors for WWT had alleged that the proprietary interest in the livestock lay with the farming partnership. That statement was WWT’s position in a disputed matter, not a court determination, but it demonstrates that partnership ownership was already an identified issue.

Howdle’s petition acknowledged that Daniel was a partner and that Hill & Company farmed Powhillon. Morrison said net proceeds would be paid to Daniel, whereas a subsequent cattle document named R Hill & Co. These records do not themselves establish the precise legal title to every animal. They show why the question ought not to be assumed away.

Fletcher’s interlocutor determined no title. No document examined records Daniel or R Hill & Co voluntarily transferring ownership of the herd. Whatever the answer to title, the order authorised the removal and prospective permanent disposal of livestock without first settling whose property was being disposed of.

The issue is therefore not only to whom any balance of sale proceeds should have been remitted. The warrant made it possible to dispose of property before the relevant title had been determined. The landlord’s 1993 correspondence had treated the partnership as owner; Howdle’s petition acknowledged that the partnership carried on the farm; and a later official document used the R Hill & Co name. None of those papers alone proves that every animal was partnership property, but all of them resist the assumption that Daniel’s personal appearance before the sheriff resolved the proprietary interests of the enterprise.

Compulsory removal is also not the same thing as voluntary relinquishment. The Crown’s own later acknowledgement that Daniel opposed the operation is inconsistent with any simple suggestion that he freely surrendered the herd. If ownership rights were to be overridden, the legal foundation had to be found in an applicable power and its conditions—not in the mere fact that the cattle had come under official control.

Fletcher’s earlier decision about the holding

Only five months before the warrant, Fletcher had decided a contested issue in the Damages Arbitration on 3 October 1996. The tenant had included £220,800 as a monetary measure of the cost of remedying alleged defects in buildings, drainage, water, roads, dykes and fences. WWT characterised that head as specific implement “by the back door”. Fletcher accepted that characterisation and excluded the head before proof of the underlying defects and loss. The tenant had sought damages, not an order requiring WWT to carry out works.

In doing so, Fletcher emphasised the Sheriff Court procedure as “an essential safeguard” where work affecting the landlord’s buildings was concerned. His written judgment did not reconcile that exclusion with Sheriff Barr’s earlier recognition of the arbiter’s statutory damages jurisdiction. The difference between those rulings is examined in Damages Arbitration.

On 20 March 1997 Fletcher authorised the removal and prospective disposal of cattle kept on the same holding without recording an ownership determination or reasons addressing the breadth and irreversibility of the result. The comparison does not prove what he privately considered. It identifies two documented exercises of judicial authority, and the different treatment of safeguards apparent in their written outcomes. The deficiencies in the holding which the tenant attributed to WWT were also among the circumstances relevant to the welfare case.

The comparison with the arbitration is specific. In the October judgment Fletcher treated court supervision as necessary protection for WWT’s ownership of buildings when presented with a claim measured by remedial costs. In March he granted a warrant affecting livestock with immediate and irreversible consequences, but his surviving decision does not show comparable consideration of title or the basis for complete disposal. The differing purposes of damages arbitration and a protective warrant must be respected. The point is the documented treatment of property safeguards in decisions made by the same sheriff about the same holding.

There is a further factual connection. The tenant’s damages claim concerned buildings, drainage and other infrastructure used to keep livestock. The subsequent prosecution relied in part upon allegations of inadequate accommodation and conditions. The relationship between the lease obligations and the husbandry complaints was never resolved by a substantive proof in the arbitration. The cattle proceedings therefore unfolded while an important part of the holding’s physical condition was still in dispute.

17 November — the later pleas could not decide the March power

The herd had gone before the November proceedings. On 17 November 1997 guilty pleas were tendered on Daniel’s behalf to five charges, with not-guilty pleas to others accepted by Howdle. No witness gave evidence at a criminal trial. Daniel disputes having authorised those guilty pleas; his challenge and the surviving court records are examined separately in Disputed Pleas. This account does not treat that dispute as already judicially resolved in his favour.

At sentence Howdle referred to the statutory power to deprive a convicted person of animal ownership. Temporary Sheriff Jamie Gilmour’s subsequent report records Howdle saying such an order was now “academic”: the cattle had already died, been destroyed or been sold, and the SSPCA held the proceeds. The significance is chronological. A deprivation provision available after conviction could not, by itself, retrospectively furnish the legal basis for the different order granted in March.

Gilmour did not adjudicate the landlord’s responsibility for buildings or agricultural conditions. His report acknowledged the possibility that Mrs Hill had a legitimate claim concerning the landlord, while leaving it to the civil proceedings. The connection between the disputed conditions, the charges and the records of the pleas is examined in Nine Charges.

What a full evidential trial would have concluded about any individual allegation cannot now be known from these papers. What is documented is that the herd had been dispersed before such a trial, the guilty pleas were contested by Daniel, and the legality of Fletcher’s March power was not determined by those pleas or by the later sentence.

The later challenges — the authority still unnamed

Daniel opposed the March 1997 application and, according to the family account, sought legal advice at the time. No order suspending the warrant was obtained before the herd was dispersed. His subsequent court applications addressed both the criminal proceedings and the authority for the earlier warrant.

The High Court’s nobile officium decision of 22 May 2003 concerned Daniel’s attempt to restore an appeal and challenge guilty pleas tendered on his behalf without his authority. It did not determine Fletcher’s warrant. In a Bill of Suspension considered on 17 November 2004, Daniel expressly asked what law empowered a sheriff to permit the sale of cattle before trial and disputed that section 134 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 conferred that power. The Bill also sought suspension of conviction and sentence. The High Court heard Daniel and the Advocate Depute and refused to pass it; the surviving interlocutor contains no substantive reasons answering the warrant-power question.

On 26 April 2017 Lord Turnbull refused warrant for service of Daniel’s nobile officium petition; his reasons of 27 April described Howdle’s application as brought at common law, treated Fletcher’s warrant as ex facie valid and rejected the argument that the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912 restricted the sheriff’s common-law powers. He found no competent ground of challenge. The reasons did not identify a particular common-law rule authorising the full order for compulsory removal and discretionary permanent disposal before conviction.

Daniel’s Bill of Suspension dated 6 August 2019 again challenged Fletcher’s warrant. It pleaded that the warrant was “fundamentally null”, questioned the reach of common-law investigative powers, and raised R Hill & Co’s ownership and the distinction between temporary custody and post-conviction disposal. The opening prayer sought suspension of “the proceedings complained of and subsequent conviction”. As the Bill identified Fletcher’s warrant as the act complained of, those words could include the warrant proceedings; its concluding prayer also sought restoration of an earlier appeal. The prayers did not expressly name suspension of the 20 March warrant itself.

On 29 August 2019 Turnbull refused warrant for service. He stated that there were “no proceedings to suspend” and considered restoration of the appeal incompetent and previously ruled upon. His reasons did not explain whether that statement included the original warrant proceedings, the subsequent criminal proceedings, or both. The refusal did not separately address the Bill’s plea of fundamental nullity or identify the substantive power for permanent disposal of the herd. His reasons also did not refer to his April 2017 decision.

The 2004, 2017 and 2019 applications were unsuccessful. Turnbull’s 2017 decision rejected a legal argument about restriction of common-law powers; his 2019 decision rejected the remedies as formulated. Those outcomes did not declare the March warrant unlawful, but the decisions examined do not identify the particular power authorising its full disposal terms. The original challenge, the later conviction proceedings and the legal authority for the warrant remain distinct questions. The court documents and legal authorities are examined in As Craved.

The consequences extended beyond the criminal case

The loss of the herd affected the continuing agricultural life of Powhillon. On 26 May 1997 agricultural officer A. J. Robertson reported severe goose damage, reduced carrying capacity and deteriorated buildings, fencing and drainage. He concluded that those conditions “will have contributed to some of the welfare problems” for which Daniel was being prosecuted. This evidence belongs alongside the veterinary criticisms; it does not displace them.

With the cattle gone, ordinary grazing ceased. In 1998 WWT sought £10,000 caution in the damages arbitration and relied upon the absence of stock, enterprise and income. The tenant was ejected in June 1999 while the arbitration over the condition of the holding was still unresolved. These events are documented further in the Shooting Trial, Damages Arbitration and Evictions.

R Hill & Co contends that the removal of the herd contributed to the end of its agricultural occupation. The records establish a sequence of decisions and consequences, not a proven common intention among every person involved. The connection matters because what began as a welfare warrant removed the farm’s working livestock, reduced its ability to operate and was later relied upon in other proceedings.

The consequences were not confined to the value of cattle sold or destroyed. An agricultural holding dependent upon livestock requires stock to graze its land and sustain the business. The removal altered that capacity abruptly. In the later disputes the absence of cattle and income was itself put forward as a fact affecting the tenancy and litigation. The 1999 ejection then occurred without the tenant’s central damages claim having been fully tried on the merits.

The March warrant cannot be understood solely as an administrative response to individual welfare complaints. It removed Powhillon’s main productive asset while the condition of the holding, responsibility for its fixed equipment and the landlord’s obligations were already contested. Those circumstances were later relevant to the tenant’s ability to continue farming.

Why R Hill & Co calls it “Cattle Stolen”

The title expresses R Hill & Co’s allegation that its working herd was taken and permanently dispersed through an exercise of public power whose substantive legal basis has not been demonstrated in the records and authorities examined. It is not a claim that a court has convicted any named individual of theft. The allegations of misuse of power and corruption are R Hill & Co’s conclusions from the documents and the consequences; questions of personal intention or legal liability require their own proof.

The essential decisions are identifiable. Howdle sought the removal of every animal and prospective sale, slaughter or destruction. Fletcher granted the request “as craved”. Officials removed the herd. The Crown later described disposal as already underway, and after the November pleas called statutory deprivation “academic”. Turnbull described the earlier warrant as ex facie valid while refusing the challenges before him, but did not name the common-law rule conferring the comprehensive disposal power.

The surviving veterinary reports warrant serious attention. The welfare of each animal mattered. So did the rights of the persons whose property and livelihood were affected, the conditions imposed by statute and the duty to exercise only powers recognised in law. Neither the seriousness of an allegation nor the professional standing of the applicant answers the prior question of competence.

The petition is recorded. The grant “as craved” is recorded. The dispersal of the herd is recorded. The particular substantive power authorising that combined result remains unidentified in the sources examined. The documentary and legal examination is set out in As Craved — The Legal Authority Behind the Cattle Warrant. The question remains: what law empowered the sheriff to order the entire herd removed and exposed to permanent disposal before conviction?

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Friday, 22 November 2019 21:56
Mee

I got sent here via a link, wish I had read it 2 years as I am currently in a massive battle with police Scotland, the p.s.d. and c.o.p.f.s

We were literally frauded by rank members of loreburn st and since then we have had our eyes opened as to the level of corruption in bucleuch st court and beyond.

We personally have had commander s stiff removed (whether temporarily or permanently we won't know until the 2 year investigation concludes) Every member of the rotary club, along with stiff have colluded (our words) to destroy business in Dumfries and you just need to see small business opened and shut in 8 weeks to bring in Julian cowie (ex c.f.o. council). Look at bigger business like comlogon castle, you'll find YOUR aforementioned accused and others along the way.

Hopefully we'll meet along the road

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